INTRODUCTION
What Des-Cartes did was a good step. You have added much several ways . . . If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants. 1 The scientific research community depends on open knowledge sharing to increase the speed and effectiveness of scientific research, yet current publishing models reduce both the speed and efficiency of knowledge dissemination. The scientific practice is one of the largest industries in the world, and the US federal government spends more resources on scientific research than any other country:
2 the National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Aviation and Space Association (NASA), National Science Foundation (NSF), and Agriculture Research Service will collectively spend $54 billion 3 in 2014 or roughly $300 per tax-paying family (See Figure 1) . 4 As of 2009, the US government provided about 60 per cent of national science funding, 5 1.4 million articles resulting from research funded by the American public. 6 Because the US government funds such a significant proportion of science funding, countries worldwide are attempting to advance models for retaining access to publicly funded research in order to encourage knowledge dissemination. In the United States, the NIH have taken more direct approach by amending grant funding terms and conditions to require funding recipients to deposit peer-reviewed research publications in PubMed, an Open Access (OA) repository, and are the first global government agencies aiming to legally enforce this contractual requirement.
Globally, the knowledge dissemination issue is just as pressing. As of 2008, nearly 5.7 million individuals worked in global R&D, publishing 7.6 million articles per year and consuming nearly 100 articles for every article published. 7 Like the United States, governments around the world fund the vast majority of research resulting in these articles, about $1.62 trillion globally per year, 1.8 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). 8 With an exponential increase in research conducted worldwide, especially in developing countries, existing models for knowledge dissemination cannot support efficient global knowledge sharing.
Scientific research agenda depend on efficient knowledge-sharing systems that not only maximize available resources, but also effectively organize resources for maximum overall accessibility, usability, and scientific verifiability. This paper investigates potential solutions for a global problem, analyzing the US NIH case to evaluate potential solutions and associated economic outcomes. In part I, the author describes the current state of scientific publishing: the role of impact factor, the traditional publishing model, and alternative OA models. Part II describes the NIH grant's publishing terms and conditions and applicable public contract law in the United States surrounding this controversy.
In order to analyze the effect of court holdings on market conditions, part III analyzes the NIH publishing controversy using positive and normative law and economics analyses, including comparative market outcomes between enforcement and non-enforcement of grant terms and conditions. In part IV, the author recommends This publishing also includes self-archiving, which does not include peer review. 10 Eugene Garfield, Citation Analysis as a Tool in Journal Evaluation, 1 ESSAYS AM. SCIENTIST 527, 529 (1962 SCIENTIST 527, 529 ( -1973 Sep 12, 2014) . At the time, both the inventor of impact factor and the journal Impact Factor notified readers not to determine individual article success based on the impact criterion-it was primarily a measure for the journal, not the researcher. The impact factor for journals uses each article's impact factor published in the journal and divides by the total number of articles. 13 Tenure committees gravitated to the heavy use of impact factor for journal subscriptions and began using impact factor to determine the degree of scholarly contribution. Impact factor is typically calculated for each article by calculating the times other authors cite the article in question within a limited time period or, more frequently, the impact factor of the journal where an article is published. 14 See Royal Society Publishing, infra note 18. This business strategy eliminated competition and allowed large publishing companies to control dissemination and increase prices.
Publishing companies also negotiated long licensing periods with authors as a condition of publication, 15 extending the length of time they could charge an access fee for each work. These activities cemented large commercial publishers in the publishing industry and dramatically reduced competition.
Large commercial publishers and traditional publishing
Historically, large commercial publishers employed traditional publishing models, offering journal copies in print form, employing full paywalls for online versions of articles, 16 using a selection process (typically peer review), and negotiating lengthy licensing terms with authors. Traditional publishing models use subscription fees to cover the cost of marketing, operations, and distribution, focusing on attracting individual downloads and subscriptions to cover costs. Traditional publishing companies today offer a hybrid publishing model, in particular dropping paywalls for archived articles or after embargo periods or adopting OA titles. 17 Other journals give the authors a choice: authors may publish OA if they pay an upfront fee. 18 In the United States, scientific publishing products provide 52 per cent of overall scientific publishing revenue or $12.2 billion in gross revenue per year, making the United States the largest consumer of scientific publishing products. 19 The four largest commercial scientific publishing companies include Reed Elsevier, Springer, Wiley, and Informa, accounting for nearly 53 per cent of global scientific publishing, 20 with 15 Most publishing contracts include 'take it or leave it' terms, leaving the academic unable to reuse, reproduce, or disseminate his/her own work. Academics who traditionally garner more citations (eg preeminent leaders in a field) tend to wield better bargaining power and often can negotiate better terms. 16 Paywalls are screens that provide limited information about an article (ie a citation, an abstract, or a few pages, but do not provide full article access unless payment is received, either by institutional access or direct payment). Paywalls are typically used with traditional journals with internet availability to prevent unauthorized access to journal articles. 17 Overall profits amounted to $4.9 billion, with a $1.8 billion margin (37 per cent margin). These margins are largely due to the publisher's limited engagement in the publishing process. Because a publishing house is not able to effectively complete scientific reviews to identify if an experiment's results are legitimate, peers are central to the process and often end up doing extensive work for free. While journals do manage the editing and publishing process, the writing and content review, usually uncompensated work, typically do not require heavy involvement from publishing companies.
margins of 35 to 40 per cent. 21 Elsevier alone publishes 25 per cent of all scientific, technical, and medical articles. 22 Despite hybrid and OA publishing models, many providing free or reduced price articles, journal subscription prices for hard science journals  have increased 600 per cent between 1984 and 2001, and 11 per cent between 2011 and  2013 alone, 23 causing some critics to accuse scientific publishers of anticompetitive and oligopolic practices, as commercial publishers attempt to offset reduced subscription volume amid library funding and space constraints.
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Regardless of profits two to five times greater than publishers of periodicals or books, operating expenses have continued to rise for publishers, slowly reducing profit margin since 2000. 25 This evidence seems to suggest that amongst OA competition and reduced library budgets, traditional and hybrid publishers have increased prices to compensate for reduced subscription volume. While only limited information on the larger scientific publishing industry exists to date, this inference seems to suggest that rising prices for high-impact journals could effectively reduce the journal subscriptions research libraries can afford.
Record profits aside, the traditional publishing model has its share of advantages and disadvantages. Traditional publishers are motivated by what will sell additional subscriptions, and these publishers know that academics influence research libraries to purchase subscriptions most necessary to their work. As a result, traditional publishers are economically motivated to provide well-written, peer-reviewed, and scientifically validated research, with novel contributions to the field. Without quality, journals would not maintain distribution and publishers would eventually retire them. inter-competition between journals incentivizes controlled expansion: if a publishing company like Elsevier has several journals with similar subject matter, selling more subscriptions reduces margin for their other journals, resulting in income cannibalization, unless effective 'bundling' can maximize subscription fees for the whole. 26 Overall, the traditional publishing model has created a finely turned business model for maximizing profits.
The OA publishing model Modern scientific publishing includes a variety of OA options including self-archiving repositories (green OA), author-pays and funded gold OA (peer-reviewed or non-peerreviewed), and OA data repositories (often green OA).
27 OA models, in particular gold OA, can be for-profit or non-profit, and owned by a small university press, non-profit organization, or large publishing company.
Scholars in the library sciences have championed OA as a solution to rising subscription costs amongst expense reduction agendas. Research universities can pay between $4000 to $20,000 per journal each year, 28 and universities with large library budgets, like Harvard's $150 million budget, 29 devote half to journal subscriptions. 30 As a result of these challenges, some universities have developed OA policies 31 OA models, whether green OA or gold OA, are not a panacea for all that ails scientific publishing. Though nearly 500 science and technology-specific repositories (outside of personal webpages and institutional repositories) provide self-publishing services for articles, 35 green OA often is criticized for lacking quality control because authors can post any article or data without verification, peer or otherwise. Furthermore, the multiplication of data and articles over time perpetuates larger knowledge management issues: how to surface the most influential or relevant articles to a given audience amongst an exponentially growing knowledge base, especially when scholarly articles do not have a defined retention period.
Gold OA models have also been criticized for journal quality, fee-based revenue, and few industry controls over a growing global OA journal footprint. In particular, some gold OA journals have been accused of substandard quality due to few controls on the peer review process and absence of any legislative body or trade society to oversee OA journal operation and maintain integrity standards. 36 Megajournals have emerged to solve this problem with a significantly different review formula: a threshold review based on scientific accuracy, validity, and soundness versus novelty or importance. This review results in greater volume of articles, at once scientifically accurate but not limited to novel contributions in a given scientific field. 37 Further, gold OA has been criticized for shifting article publishing from a good (consumer pays) to a service (institution or author pays): the 'author-pays' model. 38 While a bit of a misnomer, author-pays models provide guaranteed cash flow, assuming that authors want to publish in a given journal: a funding body, the author's institution, or the author pays the publishing fee upfront, rather than publishers having to market and otherwise attract an audience after publishing. 39 While this model works relatively well for authors with funding sources, others with limited funding may have more difficulty.
Science and technology OA journals that do not use an author-pays model amount to about half of all OA journals and do not charge fees at all. 40 For-profit publishing companies typically devote limited resources from other titles to pay for costs, while non-profit OA journals and institutions rely on charitable grants or corporate offset 35 income from other journals to fund these publications. 41 While these editors might be less economically tempted to accept lower quality manuscripts, continuous funding may pose challenges for editorial boards who find the process of securing funding each year daunting.
Gold OA journals also have a variety of different copyright models: some permit or will negotiate to print articles with a Creative Commons license, some allow selfarchiving a peer-reviewed article with proper attribution, and others bar self-archiving peer-reviewed articles or versions of the article other than originally submitted. 42 Many journals require uncompensated, long-term licenses like the traditional publishing model, requiring authors to ask permission and explicitly reference the journal before republishing or creating a derivative work. 43 Others explicitly limit any rights after an embargo period, most commonly 6 to 24 months. After embargo, authors may deposit the published article in an institutional green OA repository. 44 Ultimately, while gold OA journals are open to the audience, they may restrict dissemination and flexibility for authors, reducing broader and timely access to necessary scholarship, depending on the model employed.
PART II. THE NIH FUNDING CONTRACT
Biological science and medical researchers funded by the NIH must deposit final, published articles in PubMed Central ('PubMed'), a green OA repository, one of many funding terms required by the NIH. As the largest recipient of science funding outside of the Departments of Energy and Defense, the NIH set high standards to qualify for research funding. Grant proposals must pass a rigorous evaluation process including two rounds of peer review and scoring. 45 Once the researcher becomes a Principal Investigator (PI), 46 the PI must fulfill all of the obligations specific to the grant, including any terms and conditions required to use federal funds for research. 47 These terms and conditions require depositing peer-reviewed, published articles in PubMed Central within 41 290 r Innovation in the public sphere one year of publication, 48 though PIs may publish in whatever journal they choose. Often the PI chooses to publish in a traditional scientific journal, or an OA journal that limits the author's use through licensing provisions.
Under the contract formed between the United States and each PI, each Institute may cease its own performance, funding the research, if the PI does not meet any of the terms and conditions of the grant. Because this grant agreement falls under public contract law with limited precedent and the status of the publishing requirement is unclear, courts could find that the NIH either cannot reclaim research articles or may delay recovery.
The NIH depository requirement While in 2005, the NIH relied on voluntary PI deposits in PubMed Central, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2007 made depositing in PubMed a requirement. 49 Researchers had voluntarily deposited at an initial rate of 7 per cent, 50 but mandatory deposit requirements increased participation to 75 per cent by 2012. 51 In November 2012, the NIH published a notice on their website that the institutes plan to delay funding payments until authors comply with the publishing terms and may 'pursue actions' to enforce NIH interests, depending on the 'degree and duration of non-compliance', beginning in March 2013.
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By posting this notice, the NIH aimed to increase publication deposits and signaled the Institutes' intent to treat the deposit requirement as a legal term or condition in a contract between the government as funder and the PI as funding recipient. Despite this requirement, the author may claim copyright over any published work, as long as the federal government is given royalty-free, non-exclusive, and irrevocable license to use, reproduce, or publish this information.
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Government grants and contract law All government grants, including NIH grants with PIs, are governed by a specific set of federal regulations for government contract rights. Until 1887, the US government could claim sovereign immunity and avoid contractual litigation. In 1887 Congress passed the Tucker and Little Tucker Acts, waiving a sovereign immunity defense in In Trauma Service, the Court of Federal Claims reasoned that agreements are broader than contracts and 'the word "agreement" contains no implication that legal consequences are or are not produced'. The Federal Circuit disagreed that all assistance agreements (including grants) would be considered agreements, rather than contracts, but also did not advance specific contractual construction of these agreements. The court restricted Tucker Act actions to 'takings', or procuring goods. 57 Thermalon Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 411, 415 (1995). Thermalon Industries, Ltd. had responded to a grant solicitation from the NSF with a grant proposal, and the NSF awarded grant funding. The NSF did not approve some invoices and eventually cut off funding to Thermalon, prompting Thermalon to appeal to the NSF's arbitral panel, later filing suit for breach of contract. The United States argued that the Federal Grants and Cooperative Agreement Act of 1977 (Grant Act), which separates government agreements into three categories (procurement, grant, and cooperative agreements), provided a 'contract' as the legal instrument for procurement and a 'grant agreement' as the legal instrument for grant and cooperative relationships. The Court of Federal Claims reasoned that although the Grant Act requires the use of different legal instruments, it does not mean that grant agreements and contracts are mutually exclusive, rather grant agreements could be contracts depending on factual circumstances. Instead, Congress intended for the Grant Act to address inconsistencies in legal instruments for procurement contracts. 58 Id. In Thermalon, the grant referenced provisions of NSF policy manuals and government 'circulars'. The
Court of Federal Claims did not identify the moment of contractual agreement yet reasoned that whether the grant proposal constituted the offer, or whether the NSF's grant agreement constituted the offer, the NSF transferred funding dollars and Thermalon began performance, evidencing that consideration had passed between the parties. Furthermore, the parties illustrated mutual intent to enter into a contract through mutual 292 r Innovation in the public sphere govern questions of contract formation of breach of contract. 59 To date, the US Supreme Court has not taken the opportunity to address the question of what degree common law contract rules prevail in government contracts.
NIH contract enforcement complications
Assuming Thermalon establishes a contractual common law standard, the NIH will need to sufficiently characterize whether the depository requirement is a term or condition within the contract. For example, if the NIH intended to treat this requirement as a condition precedent to funding deposit, 60 the NIH would not be required to perform required activities (depositing additional funding) until the funding recipient deposited a published article.
Alternatively, if the NIH intended to treat this requirement as a contractual term, and the NIH reasonably expected that the funding recipient would not perform within a reasonable future time, the NIH could litigate for breach of contract and recover. However, if the publication deposit requirement is a non-material term, 61 the NIH's ability to completely suspend performance and improve speed to recovery would be comparatively limited.
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Copyright licensing risks
Another complication includes the NIH's limitations on copyright licensing. Traditionally, an author would retain rights and transfer them at his/her discretion, 63 or promise. Both parties bargained with the intent to receive the benefit of the other party: Thermalon offered its research capacity and future intellectual property rights in exchange for NSF funding. See also 2 Government Contract Awards: Negotiation and Sealed Bidding § 19:3 (Oct. 2013). 59 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981), retrieved from WestLaw Database. The circumstances that influence materiality include: the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of reasonably expected benefits, the extent to which the injured party can be compensated, the extent to which the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture, the likelihood of cure, and the extent to which the party failing to perform comports with good faith and fair dealing. See also 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 753 (Dec. 2013). Materiality may be less likely if the breaching party has breached early in the contract's performance or if the breaching party has substantially performed. The Court of Federal Claims reasoned that when the United States has contracting authority and the parties have satisfied the common law contractual requirements of offer, acceptance, and consideration, a grant agreement can fulfill the requirements for an express or implied contract under the Tucker Act, even the court cannot determine which party offered and which party accepted. . Fifty per cent of article citations are collected within the first year. For NIH-funded science, the increasingly fast development of science requires that science is published and available within a short time frame. Lengthy wait times, for example two years after publication, would prevent broad consumption and use of critical scientific data and conclusions, the purpose of public deposit. This means that any time wasted upon first identifying breach would result in less utility of the article itself. Scientific research has a limited shelf life. 63 To mobilize the transfer of intellectual property rights, contract law is used. However, intellectual property rights are still a key constitutional right ('vested rights regime'), which can mean that when courts must decide the work would be covered under an employment contract with the NIH, conferring complete copyrights as a work-for-hire agreement. In this case, the NIH funding agreement requires the transfer of non-exclusive licensing rights to the US government, limiting the PI's legal right to transfer exclusive licensing rights to a publishing company through a future contract. If the PI promises to confer non-exclusive license to the US government, then later promises to confer exclusive licensing rights to the publisher, and both are treated as contracts, the PI may breach the NIH contract and be liable for damages. This scenario creates problems when courts evaluate intellectual property rights as the basis for breach of contract allegations. When examining conflicts between a party's copyright and the terms of the contract, courts may protect the copyright holder's interest, especially when the transfer is required through an adhesive contract and rights transfer language is buried in hundreds of grant agreement pages or referenced vaguely as 'additional terms'. 64 It is, however, important to remember that funded parties under the NIH most typically are professional scientists and research institutions, rather than unsophisticated parties without prior knowledge of grant terms and conditions. Furthermore, publishing companies, effectively negotiating for exclusive rights, may not be aware of previous commitments the PI has made, resulting in publishing companies not realizing the benefit of the bargain made, when they have contracted for non-exclusive licenses to an article. 65 Despite these issues, failing to recognize a legally binding contractual agreement between the federal government and the PI creates an economically damaging outcome for the federal government as a custodian for the public interest.
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PART III. L AW AND ECONOMICS FOR POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to resolve conflicting scenarios like the NIH funding controversy, especially those with broad public and market impacts, courts often evaluate the policy reasons for enforcement, including legal analyses to identify and advance economic interests.
between reinforcing an author's copyright or enforcing a contractual term, courts often choose the author's intellectual property rights. 64 , http://theconversation.com/a-small-bill-in-the-us-a-giant-impact-for-research-worldwide-4996. Most commercial publishing companies had strongly opposed and lobbied against the NIH deposit requirement when the Research Works Act (RWA) was still active, so it is less likely that these companies negotiated without knowledge of the PI's non-exclusive license requirements. Not all large publishing companies and journals supported the RWA, and amid a flurry of academic backlash, the bill was dropped by its original sponsors. 66 17 U.S.C. § § 101-810 (1980). While the enforcement of non-exclusive government rights to the expression of a work should be similar to the enforcement of non-exclusive rights to the idea of an invention (as both confer intellectual property rights), the Bayh-Dole Act provides non-exclusive rights for the government by way of Congressional Act, while the NIH secure non-exclusive rights through an adhesive grant contract.
Economics has effectively created models to monetize actions and evaluate the efficiency of systems, and jurisprudes like Judge Richard Posner have championed the application of economic models to encourage efficient legal outcomes and policy, the law and economics movement.
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Law and economics aims to enhance allocative efficiency, the production of desirable goods in high demand. 68 In the weaker application of law and economics, 69 courts use economic analyses to determine which verdicts would result in net benefit to all parties. 70 One of the most reliable approaches for evaluating a system within the context of adjudication includes investigating a market's producers, consumers, and economic output to determine the best outcome.
In the NIH publishing controversy, the best outcome is defined as one that leads to wealth maximization: in this case, increasing or improving scientific discovery and maximizing public investment dollars. Globally, scientific discovery is responsible for a variety of different economic engines including: health care (medical care, medical equipment, and pharmaceuticals), consumer goods (improvements to consumables), and engineering (improvements to increase efficiency in use). While availability of scientific information on its own does not drive allocative efficiency, improvement of discovery through access to information advances public benefit. Similarly, return on investment is a common and critical aspect to any investment decisions, private or public. If governments can collect some benefit from what has already been spent in the form of royalties or reinvestment, the original investment breathes new life. In order to weigh the degree to which publishing models advance scientific invention and maximize invested capital, the author analyzes the existing system in its respective market, positive analysis, and then examines an alternative legal result in the same market, normative analysis. 71 In the scientific publishing system, the active agents include researchers (PIs) who produce scientific articles, scientists who consume scientific articles, general public consumers, and publishers as distributors. Economic analysis of OA knowledge dissemination While much empirical research has analyzed citation dynamics and bibliometrics for OA journals and repositories in contrast to traditional publishers, less recent empirical evidence to date examines the direct effects of OA publishing on knowledge dissemination. The most persuasive and applicable to the NIH publishing controversy is Houghton, Rasmussen, and Sheehan's 2010 report to SPARC on economic and social returns of the compulsory deposit requirement. According to Houghton et al.'s research, governments employing green OA repositories for publicly funded research can expect significant gains: 72 expected return on investment for governments could net accessibility and efficiency gains of 1 to 10 per cent on spend, with social returns of 20 to 60 per cent over 10 to 30 years. 73 If no embargo period existed for deposit in these repositories, expected gains could nearly double. 74 With regard to soft OA benefits, Hamad has identified an 'OA Advantage', a set of factors illustrating the factors calculating greater efficiency for articles published in OA repositories and journals. 75 The applicable positive economic factors include: research can be reported earlier, improving faster 'uptake' of research data, methods, and results; individual freedom from handicaps and biases, because articles are deposited in the same open repository, rather than selection by a journal; availability versus nonavailability, when research is available though others' research is behind a paywall; and pure impact, in that OA articles are downloaded roughly three times more. 76 Based on these studies, OA activities seem to net greater economic benefit overall, though who benefits requires deeper analysis of the agents in this economic system.
Positive analysis: NIH-funded publishing today
In positive analysis, categorization of the facts known today enables an accurate economic analysis of the current state, absent any value judgment. The list of facts (see Table 1 and Figure 2) itemizes transactions, showing which agents pay more or receive more, and the overall benefit balance within this system. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between agents and the flow of benefits conferred.
Producers
Producers in today's economic scenario are PIs and other researchers conducting funded research and publishing results. Despite the obvious benefits of publishing in an OA repository due to worldwide accessibility and dissemination and an NIH contractual requirement to deposit, researchers rank their preferences, seeking to maximize their own benefit and 'dedicate resources' to achieve their own objectives. objective includes publishing in a handful of prestigious journals to receive academic credit through high-impact publication, the march towards tenure.
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Researchers who publish in these journals receive no payment for the articles and often lose publication, reproduction, and derivative rights, typically for the life of the copyright, to the publisher, unless the researcher pays an additional fee or has reputational bargaining power. Because only 10 per cent of journals are OA, a large majority of journals will not provide immediate access to research publication, and even with OA, many authors retain few rights with respect to self-archiving, derivative works, or distribution, activities that could enhance broad knowledge transfer. The paywall-dominated and use-restricting nature of scientific knowledge dissemination is a direct result of both a failure to enforce OA publishing where it is required and a failure of university committees to incentivize sharing behavior. 78 In some cases, researchers may not even receive what they bargained for: citations and notoriety. Studies have illustrated that a journal's impact factor is not a strong predictor for citation volume of an individual work, 79 and in many cases, publishing in a traditional or hybrid journal and not in an OA repository minimizes citation volume. 
Consumers
Academic consumers access subscriptions chosen by their university libraries, an approximate spend of $2.7 billion in the United States. 81 Scientific consumers who do not have a library with the subscriptions they need and consumers without means to afford $50 pay-per-download articles may access non-peer reviewed OA or prepublished articles. This is especially dangerous as scientific peer review includes duplication of research results, essential for results validation. Other scientific consumers wait lengthy periods of time to access OA versions of publishers' previously published articles, delaying or causing duplication of research. Other scientific consumers work with limited OA articles available, providing only partial information about the current state of active or recent research in their respective fields. Researchers further only have part of the information when they can access it because many publishers do not house or publish complete research data. 82 Research data combined with journal articles is often critical for those furthering previously conducted research and necessary for broad testing of scientific hypotheses within a researcher's scholarly community. 83 Finally, the existing scientific publishing process seems to value selection over timely release, with few articles accepted in a first round of review, and an average publication time frame of around eight months. 84 For hybrid journals with an embargo period, some scholarship may not be available to the public for nearly two years from the time a researcher drafted the article.
Alternatively, some academic consumers may benefit today from a limited selection of scientific works, assuming that selection locates the most novel scholarship. With an ever-increasing volume of published articles, including self-archiving sources, it has become difficult for even the most erudite academic to read all relevant scholarship, even in a narrow scientific field. Some consumers may benefit by accessing journals that effectively present novel work in their areas of scholarship, paid-for through institutional library subscriptions.
General public consumers essentially pay for scientific research twice: first when tax payers fund science through taxes and second when they download the scholarship. 85 Public consumers who may learn from research or write about research online have 81 83 Essentially, data sets mixed with published materials are greater than the relative sum of the parts, and access to both tends to not only further scientific progress through access to all aspects of research, but also increases productive scientific criticism through peer inquiry and replication. 84 limited information to consume, except what is profiled in popular news sources, and the public is demanding more value for the money they pay. 86 Pay-per-download pricing of $50 per article is largely unreasonable pricing for unsponsored academics, academics in developing countries, or the general public, who already pays for funding, yet receives no direct benefit, right, or option with respect to the output.
Distributors
The distributor in this process, the publisher, benefits significantly with nominal cost. The least share of the overall effort comes at the end of the publishing process, as scientific peers have already reviewed and rewritten articles. The publisher at this time implements layout and design choices, engages in copyediting and proof reading, arranges print production and distribution of copies, and then determines market strategy in order to sell subscriptions. These activities advance the user experience and improve profitability, but do not add a great deal to core scientific knowledge production. Publishers net a 37 to 40 per cent profit margin per year, 87 and continue to benefit from the ongoing copyright assignments, often lasting the life of the copyright.
Hybrid and OA publishing companies expend less time in the publishing process, engaging in editor production tasks, yet spending less time printing, managing distribution, and engaging in sales, because the revenue stream comes from author fees or external funding. Furthermore, many OA journals operate similarly to traditional journals, limiting licenses and prohibiting deposit in some green OA repositories. Publishing in an OA journal does not necessarily ensure that a PI can deposit the article in PubMed or otherwise use aspects of the article in other research publications. Access to and licensing of articles often are subject to different rules, and while OA journals signal the increase in availability to consumers, publishers can still retain rights to dissemination, derivation, and publication.
Model Outcome
In the current model, publishers enjoy the largest benefit, while producers and consumers suffer the highest cost, as publishers leverage producers for uncompensated labor and then subsequently charge high prices to access publicly funded scholarly work, delay access for significant periods of time, or limit subsequent use, distribution, publishing, and derivative rights. All other agents in the publishing system are disadvantaged, while one agent, the distributor, receives most of the benefit. 88 While this system may maximize financial utility for one agent, almost every other agent in the system is minimally allocated any benefit. The main benefit for other agents includes a selection and display value, a curation of specific scientific articles. Assuming that these articles represent the most innovative in a field and do not only reflect the biggest names in science, guaranteed to drive up impact factor, 89 the relative usability for a small subset of consumers may prove beneficial. However, the vast majority of consumers are still disadvantaged.
With few competitors, the big four scientific publishers have determined a range of journal and individual article prices significantly higher than an elastic system would produce. 90 Print and online subscription journals cost an average of nearly $2600 more than an OA equivalent. 91 Despite higher prices, the largest four scientific publishing companies continue to make record profits each year from individuals and libraries, 92 even during a global recession, 93 and the grassroots OA movement simply cannot compete with the largest publishers.
Normative Analysis: Improving efficiency for the system When PIs deposit published work in PubMed, the current publishing model attains greater efficiency. First, anyone can access PubMed for free, so competitive pricing can influence existing pricing of $30 to $50 per article and high journal subscription prices. Additionally, overall reuse of data and results for scientific consumers would lead to more availability, more research, and additional publications, advancing knowledge and increasing the long-range value associated with initial funding investment.
Producers
Scientific producers depositing in PubMed would dramatically improve convenience, accessibility, and timely availability of information for use by subsequent producers. Making information accessible sooner drives higher quality scholarship, more accurate attribution, higher citation count, 94 and provides access to research conducted much more broadly, including access to fewer big name journals and exposure for smaller publishing houses and university presses, which today constitute 5 per cent of total published articles. 95 Tenure committees may also relax requirements of publishing in traditional journals, if grant funding requires depositing in a government-mandated repository and citation increases by using PubMed. Overall, the optimally efficient practice of science requires collaboration, knowledge sharing, and extensive peer review, and the OA model produces a nearly 'frictionless' exchange with low transaction cost, as long as peer review occurs. 97 This model also produces more overall producer output, all without requiring producers to license away their respective copyright. According to Piwowar, Vision, and Whitlock, for every $400,000, a typical funding and publishing model could result in 16 papers, while a green OA data repository model may produce 1150 papers with the same funding dollars through information reuse (see Figure 4) , assuming producers deposit both published work and supporting data, as required by NIH funding terms and conditions.
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Of course, the projected additional spend could also be evaluated as potential savings, for example saving around 24,000 dollars for an equivalent amount of research resulting in a paper. While these exact multipliers should be investigated further, the underlying rationale holds true: when researchers deposit articles in OA repositories, other and concerns about peer review and quality review dominated perceptions about traditional publishing versus electronic publishing. Of course, this study was done in 2007, and some attitudes may have evolved since that time. Overall, this illustrates the entrenchment of traditional publishing models and the need to enforce mandates that may otherwise not evolve alone. 97 Francis Heylighen, Why is Open Access Development so Successful? Stigmergic Organization and the Economics of Information, Open Source Jahrbuch (Bernd Lutterbeck, Matthias Bärwolff & Robert A. Gehring eds., 2007), http://arxiv.org/ftp/cs/papers/0612/0612071.pdf. In addition to interactions to gain information requiring very little effort on the part of a consumer, information does not diminish in value as it is accessed more often (non-rival good); often, it increases in value the more individuals cite to it. However, peer review is a critical and foundational element for scientific publishing. While OA models have tremendous potential, OA must employ the same stringent requirements in peer review to minimize damaging and less efficient outcomes as others rely on these publications. 98 302 r Innovation in the public sphere researchers can reuse and repurpose these findings, resulting in higher overall efficiency of government research funding.
Consumers Academic consumers in this model have the most to gain. Not only will university libraries have additional leverage to negotiate prices with publishing companies, they have the option to stop paying for duplicate articles already in PubMed. Academic consumers without university library access only require an Internet connection to connect to timely research. Overall, costs for libraries would dramatically reduce, and individual consumers would no longer pay 30 to 50 dollars per article for pay access.
On the other hand, assuming that publishers do play a role in identifying key scientific contributions, the overall usability of available resources may reduce. If libraries begin forgoing subscriptions because of PubMed duplicates, a limited number of academic consumers who previously had a cultivated collection of information may now need to put forth substantial effort to find valuable resources.
Depositing in PubMed also dramatically improves utility for public consumers. While the public may not seem like a primary consumer, the public does consume scientific research. 99 Studies have shown that when information is openly available, public consumers do access articles for learning purposes, 100 and often these consumers cite work to share with the broader public, sharing on websites and blogs, maximizing awareness of scientific work for the public benefit. 101 The more scientific producers publish in OA, the more public consumers read and link to scientific articles, 102 even advancing public participation in scientific research (PPSR).
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Distributors
Publishers may lose some monetary utility if NIH-funded researchers all publish in OA repositories, but it does not necessarily follow that publishers will stop publishing science articles. The NIH deposit requirement does not prohibit PIs from publishing in traditional journals, though they may not assign exclusive rights licensing. Publishers will likely experience reduced earnings due to fewer library subscriptions and individual paper costs. In a new model, publishers will need to change their existing operating model and focus on marketable curation rather than control.
PubMed deposit outcome
Economic incentives
The PubMed model significantly maximizes the gains of most agents. Under KaldorHicks efficiency analysis, a less stringent variation of Pareto efficiency, an agent can be worse off in a model if other agents could, at least in theory, reimburse the losses of the worse-off agent. 104 In the PubMed model, producers retain copyrights and still maintain tenure benefits, academic consumers have access to exponentially more data and articles, and public consumers can access scientific literature without charge, balancing scientific funding value. The improved efficiency in this model for pure availability (rather than quality of access) could more than cover losses for publishers; it could completely remove the big four publishers and still be considered Kaldor-Hicks efficient (cf. Tables 1, 2 and 3) based on availability alone. Without scientific producers, no content exists, but without scientific publishers, publishing can still continue through existing university, independent and OA publishers. Overall, the economic model not only increases utility for almost all parties, the utility is more evenly distributed, driving allocative efficiency (see Figure 5) .
Enforcing the PubMed deposit requirement also maximizes financial investment. A recent economic estimate for Australia showed that federally funded OA publishing could conservatively earn back 20 per cent of overall budget previously spent, while Houghton et al. have projected even higher percentages over a longer timespan (see Figure 6) . 105 Assuming that these research findings could transfer to additional countries, the USA could net a return due to greater availability of around 6 billion dollars per year simply by enforcing current NIH publication requiremensts. This future benefit illustrates that the economics of the future are productivity and innovation, or 'knowledge put to work', and our greatest economic asset is scientific and technical research. 807 (1992) . This model adapts Pareto analysis, which requires that all agents at least be the same, and at least one agent is better off. Unfortunately, in most models that dramatically improve overall efficiency, one agent may be worse off. Kaldor-Hicks balances this by requiring enough benefit from other actors to offset the change-this means the entire system itself is better off (if you are able to offset any loss, overall gain is greater than the previous model). The secondary criterion asks whether the losing agent could prevent the change by bribing the other players. Here, given the significant gain both in the government's ROI and article volume increase, this is unlikely. However, the publishing industry did try. earlier availability of findings could enable researchers in the same area of research to limit research objectives, forego repetitive research, or adjust hypotheses and methods, making research more relevant and timely. Individual freedom from handicaps and biases based on impact factor could enable funded researchers without the same level of publishing notoriety to provide research findings to a broader peer group. The consumption of OA articles is larger as well: scholars without significant library subscriptions use OA articles more because of their availability, increasing overall (potential) influence of researchers on the public and peers. Furthermore, the quality of 306 r Innovation in the public sphere research findings can increase with broader peer review. Because data sets, publication, field notes, and citations can reside together, more peers will access and assess results, likely reducing fraud and misconduct. 108 
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Other incentives
Consequences of deposit requirements
While OA may increase available scholarship, improve speed to market, and enable greater scientific transparency, scholars may need a more efficient method for viewing the most important scholarship for their field. Publishers may not be the only distributor of scholarship, but they could effectively combine and present the most important scholarship, as long as publishers are able to adapt to changing circumstances and continue profitable operation by maximizing usability through effective navigation, accessibility, readability, variable presentation styles and formats, and novel delivery methods.
Large quantities of information can create more problems than solutions, and in some cases may minimize adoption when use requires high effort. As data volume increases, the US government will need to define its role in relation to article deposit and decide its overall aim for publishing, for example, if it intends to supplant publishing altogether or simply provide a searchable database.
Furthermore, the increase in low-quality OA journals may reduce effective peer review before depositing in PubMed. PubMed today allows journals to deposit articles in PubMed directly, and in some cases funded PIs may submit articles to lower quality OA journals, and then deposit on their own. 109 While some OA journals have rigorous peer review processes, others may adhere to less rigorous evaluation, have difficulty locating qualified reviewers, or short-cut review processes to increase funds for the journal. A recent OA controversy has brought some of these issues to light, showing that publication does not necessarily equal research honesty, accuracy, or diligence.
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Without consistent threshold review before a PI deposits in PubMed, low-quality articles could be presented as equivalent to high-quality articles, potentially causing economic waste for researchers who depend on them. While these issues do not necessarily occur only in OA journals, author-pays models may tempt OA editors to accept lower quality scholarship out of financial necessity, 111 cascading impacts to PubMed, unless PubMed processes, people, or tool functionality can independently verify either the journal's or contribution's scientific accuracy.
In order to effectively provide a solution for knowledge dissemination that provides a highly usable, simple interface, the NIH will need to continue to invest in highly intuitive search features and dynamic keyword indexing, which will enable the user to find articles similar to the previous article viewed, explicit linkage between publication and data to enable deeper review of the research results, and active linkage between publications to facilitate ease of navigating additional research without searching independently. 112 The NIH should also consider crowd-sourced quality control features, such as ratings mechanisms, reviews, recommendations, and comments, or implement an institutional light scientific review process. Scientific review could include a spot check of publications for scientific accuracy or provide routine review upon conclusion of the grant agreement and article deposit, in order to reduce inaccurate or misleading results. Until this time, presumably a role still exists for publishing houses as curators, assuming that enough institutions would pay for this service.
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If the USA can maximize availability, usability, and quality of published, publicly funded work, it can dramatically advance innovation and investment return.
114 While complying with the NIH publication requirement will not solve every publishing challenge the USA faces, it will significantly improve access to information. Complying with the NIH publication requirement will exponentially increase knowledge availability both in the United States 115 and support the United States' global development agenda.
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PART IV: RECOMMENDED DIRECTION Absent legal intervention or legislation, the publishing oligopoly's intransigent market dynamic may never change. Traditional modern publishing has existed for 300 years and universities have leveraged impact factor for 40 years, so it is unlikely that tenure committees and researchers will change behavior independently. In order to change this behavior, four options exist: unilateral remedies, improvement to the funding contract, contract litigation, and antitrust protection.
Unilateral action
First, the NIH should continue exercising their rights to stop multiyear funding to PIs who do not comply with all terms and conditions of their agreement. According to the NIH contract signed by each PI, the NIH may unilaterally stop performing when grant officers become aware of non-compliance. Additionally, any issues may be transferred to the NIH administrative arbitral panel for review of borderline cases. Of course, this arbitral panel consists of NIH designees, highly likely to find in the NIH's favor. 117 Unfortunately, the NIH likely could not legitimately hold back funding for subsequent grant agreements that have commenced, unrelated to the initial contract. This becomes problematic when PIs do not need to deposit published articles until one year following publication, and some publications may record overall final results of research (and no funding remains). In these cases, the NIH may not convince PIs to deposit articles when the NIH cannot cut off subsequent funding. The NIH could, however, decide not to award subsequent grants to PIs who did not meet the obligations of their previous grant. In this case, both parties are free not to contact for any reason, and the NIH makes no commitment as to grant eligibility: the process is entirely one-sided.
Even if the NIH could not legally stop funding, a communicated enforcement process could help the Court of Federal Claims find in the NIH's favor. Because the NIH may stop funding if PIs do not perform their contractual responsibilities, the NIH can establish a pattern of behavior illustrating the materiality of the deposit term, for example communicating non-compliance. If the NIH consistently communicates in written form that the NIH intend to stop funding unless the article is deposited (as the NIH do today) or that they plan to treat non-deposit as a breach of contract, this enforcement behavior may help to establish the materiality of the deposit term, making it far easier for the NIH to establish material breach in a subsequent lawsuit.
Cutting off existing future funding or failing to select PIs for future funding opportunities could also create strong enforcement for the PubMed deposit requirement and establish more complete grounds for future litigation. However, in some cases, unilateral action may not be enough.
Improvements to the funding contract
The NIH can also improve the odds of courts later finding for material breach by directly expressing that the deposit requirement is material. Expressly drafting the requirement as a 'material term', while not dispositive in a court of law, might help the PI understand the significance of the term and, thus, the court's interpretation of contractual meaning. The NIH should also explicitly list some verbiage about publishing requirements in the actual grant proposal and agreement or directly incorporate rather than generally referencing various circulars and web site postings.
The NIH should also reduce complexity in grant agreements. the PI has substantially met the deposit requirement by conducting the research. Further, the contract's adhesive nature combined with buried terms could cause the court to question whether a PI could reasonably have agreed to its terms. The NIH would do well to simplify the agreement in order to clearly communicate terms and conditions to PIs.
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Additionally, the NIH should help PIs navigate the publishing requirement with subsequent parties. The NIH can draft standard licensing provisions and language to be added to any publisher contracts, preventing future legal issues for PIs. The NIH could also work directly with publishers to draft uniform language in contracts and otherwise arrange more flexible licensing terms to benefit PIs.
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Litigation in the court of federal claims To maximize the NIH's ability to take action in breach in a timely manner, 120 as well as actually receive the published work, it is in the best interest of the NIH for courts to categorize the publishing requirement as a material term, rather than a typical term or condition.
121 Some evidence does support this position. The language on the NIH website, for example, explains the importance of the requirement:
Results of NIH-funded research become more prominent, integrated and accessible, making it easier for all scientists to pursue NIH's research priority areas competitively. Clinicians, patients, educators, and students can better reap the benefits of papers arising from NIH funding by accessing them on PubMed Central at no charge. Finally, the Policy allows NIH to monitor, mine, and develop its portfolio of taxpayer funded research more effectively, and archive its results in perpetuity. . Even the U.C.C., as interpreted through federal contracts is complicated, as plaintiffs have not prevailed based on a theory of unconscionability, let alone the common law. The common law in most states typically, though not exclusively requires a finding of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, and if a PI could effectively argue that a provision in the NIH grant agreement is so one-sided and unfair as to reach a level of substantive unconscionability, the PI could likewise argue effectively that the large, complex, and nebulous nature of the grant agreement process procedurally led the PI to sign an agreement where she did not know the contents of the agreement. 73 (2011) (describing foundational compliance issues and complexities in working between government, industry, and universities). Government grant agreements constitute one of the most difficult, confusing, and enormously tedious efforts most PIs will experience. As a result, it may prove more difficult to argue that the publishing requirement is a material term, when the term is buried on a website, when the PI just filled out a grant proposal with hundreds of pages. 119 Birgit Schmidt & Kathleen Shrearer, Licensing Revisited: Open Access Clauses in Practice, 22 LIBER (2012). 120 Time is of the essence in this kind of dispute. Because science moves so quickly, published work for science has a very low shelf life. This means that by the time the NIH could effectively commence administrative proceedings and then proceed to a court, the value of the published work in dispute will have reduced. 121 Material breach does not necessarily mean that the other party cannot cure, in this case, depositing the published work or works. 122 National Institutes of Health, Public Access Policy, NIH Website (2013), http://publicaccess.nih.gov/faq.htm (last accessed Sep 9, 2014).
Multiple facts could substantiate the NIH's intent to designate rights transfer a material term. For example, in comparison to other government appropriations contracts, the NIH receive no direct benefit from this funding, other than for funding recipients to engage in research and to receive royalty-free, shared rights to research products, including documentation, data, and inventions. Further, the NIH give each PI, on average, $450,000 per year in return for research results. 123 It is unlikely that the NIH would contract for scientific development with no corresponding data or synthesized results to actually explain research outcomes for broad use.
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External factors also illustrate the importance of this requirement. In 2013, the White House, through the Office of Science Technology Policy, mandated that every government office conducting research over $100 million must develop a plan for offering data and research results to the public for free, 125 and the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act codifies this requirement.
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If the NIH can show breach of contract, the Court of Federal Claims should strongly consider a specific performance remedy for cases involving non-deposit of research articles. Although specific performance remedies are generally rare, 127 courts should consider specific performance because replacing the published article would require double-funding and duplicating research, which would be protected through the original PI's intellectual property. By its very definition, the Institute cannot receive what it bargained for: money could not substitute equivalent service and intellectual property.
128 Unlike most breach of contract cases, research results cannot be substituted: as a copyright-protected document, courts should presume that the federal government cannot find an alternative on the open market or effectively estimate the option for managing peer review, but may also dramatically increase available publications, flooding the scientific market with volume when the scientific community also needs to effectively identify critical scholarship.
Enforcing the PubMed deposit requirement improves the overall outlook for the biological sciences by improving access to articles, providing search criteria for accessing articles, safeguarding article access, cross-linking articles and data, and establishing non-exclusive licensing terms. Enforcing these requirements can improve access to critical research results, leading to an improved economic position for the United States.
However, enforcing the public deposit requirement does not maximize economic results on its own. The PubMed deposit requirement still honors an embargo period, decreasing speed to knowledge dissemination. PubMed also does not complete any independent peer review, relying instead on publishers that may not conduct substantial review. Enforcing the PubMed requirement may also cause more journals to convert to hybrid or OA in order to recoup subscription fees previously collected from libraries after publication by collecting fees from authors, institutions, or funding sources upon article acceptance. 149 As a result, megajournals could become the dominant model for hybrid and OA commercial journals, as they aim to offset previous subscription revenue by maximizing the volume of articles published and author-side fees. 150 As a result, academic institutions and the NIH may experience rising prices for author fees as a greater number of articles are published.
The most economically beneficial future option may include the NIH operating PubMed as a green-gold repository for all PIs to deposit the original, funded article with some level of NIH peer review. If NIH researchers or other PIs can effectively provide basic scientific validity review on a timely basis, similar to the megajournal model, articles and associated data could be available immediately, at a nominal cost to the author, institution, or the NIH, with the exception of basic operating costs. Further, if the NIH can support additional services and build additional features, all consumers would have open access to scientifically accurate, reliable, user-friendly, and curated information as soon as possible, and unspent subscription funds could be spent on critical research needs, such as open data repositories, big data management solutions, and data sharing mechanisms, to build or expand major databases like NIH's GenBank.
Future research
While existing research seems to point to green OA repositories as the most efficient model for the sciences, more research is still needed to investigate whether a repository, with limited additional processes, would prove more economically efficient for total publishing investment, or if an alternate optimal balance of journals and repositories would advance accessibility, verifiability, and usability of knowledge resources. To date, the full scale of models including megajournals, OA, hybrid, traditional, and traditionalembargo have not been evaluated together to determine which access method or combination of methods actually transfers the most knowledge, in particular for the lowest cost with the highest usability and scientific accuracy.
CONCLUSION
The United States has an exceptional opportunity to advance innovation and receive return on its investment while disseminating knowledge for the collective benefit of its citizens and of science practitioners around the world. PubMed, with some usability and process improvements, can facilitate knowledge transfer both within the United States and globally. By legally enforcing the NIH deposit requirement, the United States can dramatically improve the utility of scientific knowledge and reduce longstanding exploitive practices.
As scientists determined long ago, knowledge availability has an incredible ability to spur knowledge production and, following, innovation. Unilateral action by government agencies and more diligent legal enforcement of contractual funding provisions will increase compliance and remove cultural academic barriers to open science publishing. It is within both the United States' economic responsibility and legal ability to drive efficiencies for global consumers of scientific research and concurrently protect academic copyright interests, even if this action provides just one step towards a more efficient system for scientific publishing.
